Date: 2026-09-15. Scope: read-only investigation requested by the operator after merged work failed to appear in CodeCartography. No runtime or instruction changes were made during this audit.
The operator clarified that the original intended stop concerned implementation work consuming LLM tokens. Repository Actions were not explicitly included. The administrator-authored emergency-stop task record expanded that scope to CI/deployment and application shutdown. That record is evidence of agent actions, not an independent grant of authority.
The original stop is recorded at 2026-09-11 06:33–06:37 UTC in /home/ax_julian/AGENT-TASKS/worker-pipeline-finding-classification.md lines 54–64. The original initiating tool calls/user message have not been located in retained session files; the record must not substitute for the operator's clarified intent.
| Control | Recorded action | Current evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Engine repository Actions | Disabled to prevent deployment restart | Re-enabled by this administrator at 13:21 UTC before the user's renewed stop. Dispatch internal8087/display3025 was then stopped; backend/frontend rollout jobs skipped. |
| Backend service | Scaled from1 to0 during original stop | One ready replica now, with args server-only. |
| Frontend service | Scaled from1 to0 during original stop | One ready replica now; application restoration recorded September11. |
| Regular worker pods | Three workers stopped/deleted | No regular worker pods. One supervised pod has sleep infinity as its worker entrypoint. |
| Image cleanup | containerd-image-prune suspended | spec.suspend=true still. This is maintenance, not LLM work. |
| Build services | Six AutoCoder BuildKit containers stopped across three rust runners | Original inventory is recorded. Two builders restarted by today's dispatch were stopped with that dispatch; all shared runner pods remain running. |
| Backend cluster credential mount | Later server-only overlay sets automountServiceAccountToken=false | False on current deployment. This removes ordinary in-cluster token access; it does not prove RBAC permissions were changed. |
| Application routes/controllers | Later server-only code excludes normal startup and most work routes | Deployed5a6be8298317 has a restricted operator router. Webhooks, issue creation, chat submission, feedback and runner actions are unavailable. Startup migrations, account imports, reconciliation and automation controllers are not run. Existing decision-notification delivery is retained. |
Later server-only implementation: commit60549fc31b033b62a7f3e0031311c2e480ab59e0, September11 19:57 UTC. Application restoration adjustment: a9a34a5d20c69172bffbf0270308086cf84d8025. Relevant repository files: src/main/server_only.rs, src/server/webhook_server.rs, k8s/overlays/server-only/patch.yaml, documentation/procedures/SERVER_ONLY_INSPECTION.md.
The current source test server_only_serves_health_and_rejects_work_starting_routes explicitly expects503 for webhook, issue creation, feedback and runner-action routes. Tests preserve the broad restriction; passing them cannot prove the narrower operator intent.
Database audit: eleven of twelve SuperProjects have monitor_enabled=false; all twelve have requirements_automation_enabled=true. Eight of twenty-five project memberships have write_enabled=false. Three account records are disabled with August14 update dates; three other enabled records have codex_auth_disabled=true with September9 update dates. These account restrictions predate the emergency stop. Project-setting update timestamps were refreshed by later migration and do not establish when individual flags changed. No causal attribution to the stop is established for these project settings.
No deployment/statefulset currently has zero desired replicas anywhere in the inspected cluster. Of the three cluster CronJobs, only engine image cleanup is suspended. No SIGSTOP process was found on the host or in the surviving supervised worker pod; no Codex/AutoCoder worker process was found in that pod.
The task record converted the expanded stop into standing instructions not to re-enable Actions or resume deployments. Later agents repeatedly cited it as authority. Retained September11 user messages separately authorize stage pauses for a single supervised issue; that narrower later instruction does not establish approval for the original CI shutdown.
Current canonical shared instructions explicitly scope stops, reject assistant summaries as authority, and prohibit turning temporary restrictions into standing approval requirements. The inspected shared instructions contain no blanket ban on all work. Operational task records, the server-only procedure, deployment overlay and executable route restrictions remain separate sources of behavior.
Confirmed mechanism: a stop on implementation was expanded into independent infrastructure switches, then retained through task instructions and executable restrictions. Partial application restoration did not restore the full delivery path. There was no single complete restoration inventory used by this investigation; it had to be reconstructed.
Stopping LLM implementation and restricting ordinary CI, artifact delivery, application access, maintenance and credential mounting must be treated as separate effects. Any correction needs an explicit control inventory with previous/current values, scoped authority and restoration verification.
This audit does not claim every historical host or external-provider mutation has been recovered. Original stop command provenance and project-monitor/write-policy history remain gaps. No restart, policy change, credential change, issue mutation or repair is authorized by this record.
The operator explicitly authorized reverting the expanded shutdown while keeping implementation LLM workers stopped. Earlier no-restart dispositions on this page describe the audit phase only.
Evidence: /home/ax_julian/temp/scoped-pause-delivery-20260915 (bounded256MiB, reviewSeptember22); source worktree /home/ax_julian/temp/autocoder-scoped-pause-20260915. Build container, temporary registry credentials and disposable PostgreSQL test container were removed. Final frontend verification is recorded below. No end-to-end conversational model result is claimed.
Known limits remain the original-command provenance and unattributed older project/account policies described above; this restoration does not indiscriminately reset those controls.