Date: 2026-09-07 UTC. Authority: active administrator task to repair AutoCoder's feedback-to-verified-delivery pipeline.
The autocoder-agent-worker-runtime Role in namespace autocoder-engine had no rules. Its repository source, AutoCoder/AutoCoder-Engine/k8s/01-rbac.yaml, already declared read-only pod access. The live last-applied record dated from 2026-05-09. The deployment workflow does not apply RBAC, and its CI service account has no role-editing permission; therefore ordinary image deployments did not reconcile this drift.
Only that Role was extracted from the checked-in manifest, scope-checked, server-dry-run validated and applied using the administrator context. No service account, binding, CI privilege, secret, deployment, or cluster-wide permission was changed. The resulting policy permits get,list on pods and get on pod logs solely in autocoder-engine.
Verification:
sha-7f6e7a522e9c and immutable digest sha256:410b975eafed24e2e21130c7653a0c73b858acdd5132cf3990ec6e535301aaed.Cost is bounded to existing read requests and metadata; no additional workloads or paid model calls were started. Pod logs can contain operationally sensitive information, so namespace scope and authorized task purpose still apply. This restores existing repository policy rather than giving agents cluster-administration authority.
Rollback, if a concrete security reason requires it, is an administrator-reviewed restoration of the prior empty rules. That would again disable runtime evidence collection. No rollback was performed.
This operational verification establishes access and observable deployment identity, not managed-product acceptance. Engine capability preflight, durable recovery of previously failed acceptance tasks, and representative end-to-end delivery remain separate follow-up work in the engine repository.